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Intervention in a “Divided World”:
Axes of Legitimacy
Nathaniel Berman1

Following World War I, which ended more than 83 years ago, the whole
Islamic world fell under the crusader banner - under the British, French,
and Italian governments. They divided the whole world … Those who refer
things to the international legitimacy have disavowed the legitimacy of the
Holy Book…
•

Osama Bin Laden, November 20012

[The U.N. must] prove to the world whether it's going to be relevant or
whether it's going to be a League of Nations, irrelevant.
• George W. Bush, September 20023
And while it is difficult to see the world body go down the drain like its
predecessor the League of Nations … it is equally difficult to see how the
United Nations will regain the status and relative coherence it enjoyed
before Operation Iraqi Freedom.
•

The Independent (Banjul) March 20034

Abstract: In the post-2001 era, many fear that the “international community” that had been
developing in the years after the Cold War is becoming irremediably divided. Challenges to the
“international community” have come from such radically disparate quarters as U.S.
unilateralism and Islamicist attacks on allegedly “western” internationalism. Many worry that
such divisions will severely hamper the ability of the international community to intervene in
local crises, whether for humanitarian purposes or to stop ethnic conflict. This article
challenges the major assumptions upon which this common view is based. First, it rejects the
notion that the “international community” ever had the kind of unity that is retrospectively
attributed to it. Secondly, it rejects the notion that such an illusory unity is necessary for the
legitimacy of international interventions even of the boldest variety. Rather, by examining
recent fears in light of the history of bold international action since World War I, it develops a
complex schema for evaluating forms of international legitimacy and forms of critique of that
legitimacy. In light of this analysis, it shows how legitimacy can be achieved, even if only
provisionally, even under the most fractious international conditions. In particular, it shows
how the achievement of such legitimacy depends on distinguishing actions in the name of
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internationalism from seemingly similar actions that lie in international law’s discredited
colonial past.
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I. “Status and Coherence”
A. The Internationalist Dream
It would be tempting to look back at the long post-Cold War decade as an era of
the more or less steadily growing legitimacy of an activist internationalism – an era that
began with “1989” and ended somewhere between “9/11” and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
A representative example of this perspective was provided by a writer in a Gambian
newspaper shortly after the start of the invasion of Iraq (the third of the three epigraphs to
this paper).5 The writer declared that the US attack would probably signal the demise of
the “status and relative coherence” previously enjoyed by the United Nations,
condemning it to the fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations. This writer’s views
characterized much of pro-internationalist world opinion at the time of the American
action.
5
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If internationalism seems to such observers to have suffered a severe blow, the
post-Cold War decade often appears to them by contrast as something of a golden age, in
which internationalism had “status” and “coherence.” This contrast between the deep
fractures of the present with a more harmonious recent past reflects the persistent dream
of an international community with the status of a legitimate identity and the coherence
of integrated ideals and practices. Above all, this dream is that of a community that
would thoroughly integrate state power into internationalist principle – hence the gravity
of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This internationalist dream has usually been articulated in
the mode of absence – as a nostalgic lament for the loss of the community or a
millenarian hope for its construction. It is a dream that particularly appeals to legal
internationalists – and may account for the fact that writings addressed to the problem of
“The Disintegration of International Society”6 and “International Law in a Divided
World”7 have come to constitute a traditional genre favored by some of the leading
international lawyers over the past century. It may also account for the fact that a
dichotomy between an international law founded on the principle of equality and one
founded on the power of “hegemonism” has seemed a useful analytical axis to widely
divergent observers over the past several decades.8
It would not be difficult, however, to argue that remembering the long post-Cold
War decade as a time of steadily, even if unevenly, growing internationalist legitimacy is
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a retrospective illusion. Words like Srebrenica and Rwanda should be enough to remind
us of internationalism’s incoherence during that period, due to the selectivity of its
attentions; words like Kosovo should remind us of its uncertain status, due to the
intermittence of respect shown by states to the need to subordinate their action to the
authority of the formally constituted international community.
To be sure, many who share the nostalgia for the long post-Cold War decade may
readily acknowledge that it was a time of numerous swings in internationalist prestige.
Yet, criticism of post-Cold War internationalism is usually presented in the ameliorative
mode. Challenges to the selectiveness of internationalists’ attentions or the lack of
inclusiveness of participation in their decisionmaking councils are usually intended to
lead the international community to make good on its universal claims, rather than attack
its foundation. Such criticisms, therefore, are not incompatible with treating the failures
and disappointments of the long decade as the inevitable travails of a universal
international community struggling to be born, however regrettable and even tragic those
travails may have been.
Since the end of the long post-Cold War decade, however, the very ideal of the
gradual transformation of the world into a community governed by widely-accepted
internationalist principles and institutions has been subjected to a series of high-profile
attacks. Perhaps the most well-known of these attacks issued from the very different
quarters of Osama bin Laden and George W. Bush (the first and second epigraphs to this
paper). As we shall see, where bin Laden primarily attacked the status of
internationalism due to its putatively illegitimate identity, Bush primarily attacked its
coherence, due to the putative gap between its principles and its institutions. Like the
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internationalist writer in the Gambian newspaper, both of these challengers cited the
League of Nations as an important reference, though each did so with very different
intents. As a result of such attacks, the prospect of the ideological redivision of the world
into competing “legitimacies” has begun to appear to some internationalists as a grave
danger, provoking a variety of discursive and practical strategies. Strategies designed to
meet other challenges to internationalism in the past, such as those of Fascism in the ‘30s,
Communism during the Cold War, and the US during the Vietnam era, have begun to
play a visible role.
In this paper, I propose that we reject the nostalgia for the long post-Cold War
decade as both historically inaccurate and theoretically flawed. It would be easy, for
example, to show that current challenges to internationalism – and the counter-attacks on
them – were in full play throughout the long decade. More fundamentally, I propose that
we reject the utopian dream of an international community that would finally have
integrated power and principle. Activist internationalism will always appear to some as
mere power for at least two reasons. First, ideological divisions in the world are not a
product of a fall from grace, but of the human condition – periodic announcements of the
“end of ideology” notwithstanding. “Status” challenges, attacking the putatively
universal community as ideologically partisan, will therefore be a persistent feature of
international debate. Secondly, the final integration of power and principle is impeded by
the fact that internationalist principles and institutions are themselves deeply
heterogeneous – rendering the achievement of “coherence,” even “relative coherence,” a
provisional and contested affair. Internationalism, especially in its legal dimension,
consists of a body of rules and institutions in which “self-determination” must always
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confront “sovereignty,” “minority protection” must face “individual rights,” “free trade”
must always confront the “right to development,” the equality-principle that governs the
General Assembly must always face the power-principle that governs the Security
Council, and so on. Attempts at effecting “coordination”9 among these elements will
never achieve more than a temporary consensus. The bin Laden-style attacks on
internationalism’s status and the Bush-style assaults on its coherence are not exceptional,
but only the latest instances of perennial challenges. Indeed, such challenges reveal
much about the theoretical and practical elements of internationalist legitimacy – a
legitimacy found not in a golden past or future, but provisionally wrested out of the
divisions of the present, particularly out of the crucibles of the kinds oflocal conflicts
whose pacification our era has implicitlyidentified as central tasks for any
internationalism.
Taking the legitimacy of international intervention in local conflicts as my focal
point, I argue that we reject the quest for an international community that would finally
have achieved status and coherence. Rather, I advocate a focus on the situational,
provisional aspect of legitimacy, on the way internationalist actors must continually seek
to reachieve legitimacy in relation to a variety of constituencies and in the face of everchanging developments. In short, I argue for an understanding of internationalist
legitimacy which is less foundational and more vulnerable, less static and more tentative,
less certain and more messy.

B. Axes of Challenge, Axes of Competition

9
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Those who challenge the legitimacy of dominant internationalist ideals and
institutions usually present bids to legitimate competing alternatives. Those who attack
the status of internationalism present an external critique of its identity as a whole, an
identity they perceive as both specifiable and pernicious (“Crusader,” “Capitalist,”
“Imperialist,” “American,” etc.). In keeping with the nature of their challenge, they
usually propose a competing internationalism embodying a different identity (“Islamic,”
“Communist,” “Third Worldist,” “multilateralist,” etc.). Bin Laden provides an example
of this kind of critique and competing bid.
By contrast, those who attack the coherence of internationalism problematize the
specifiability of its identity by highlighting the heterogeneity of its internal elements.
They allege that these elements – discursive, practical, and institutional – have been
wrongfully or irrationally articulated, wrongfully or irrationally assembled, or wrongfully
or irrationally implemented. They may make a bid to establish a competing alternative
structure by presenting a competing configuration of these elements – for example, by
giving some element, such as self-determination or sovereignty, more weight relative to
the other elements than it possesses in the prevailing regime, while still seeking to
achieve coherence, though a new kind of coherence, between their favorite element and
the others. They may, alternatively, reject the search for coherence and seek legitimacy
for their perspective by defying the demand for satisfying the claims of all the elements.
In opposition to the legitimacy of coherence, they may thus make a bid for a “legitimacy
through defiance” – a legitimacy that derives its power by overtly privileging certain
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elements and denigrating others.10 George W. Bush provides an example of this kind of
legitimacy bid.
I argue that external critiques of internationalism’s status – i.e., the ideological
rejection of the legal system as a whole – do not alone account for the most serious
challenges to internationalism in the past century. Rather, the strength of these
challenges stemmed from their ability to link this external opposition with an internal
critique of internationalism’s incoherence. In the past, for example, Nazi and Communist
publicists sought to undermine the prevailing international legal order both by attacking
its identity (for example, as “Jewish” or “Capitalist”) and by heightening the tensions
between heterogeneous principles as they related to particular local conflicts. The
challengers’ external critique, their attempt to delegitimate the system as a whole,
weakened internationalists’ authority to persuasively produce new configurations of these
disparate concepts in response to new developments in local conflicts. At times, these
challengers made bids for a competing legitimacy of coherence; at other times, they
sought a legitimacy of defiance by fiercely denigrating previously hallowed principles
and exorbitantly privileging others. This kind of linkage between external and internal
critique, and between critique and competing legitimacy bids, has played a very powerful
role at various junctures over the past century.
Such double challenges enable us to see, by contrast, the double source of
internationalism’s legitimacy. In periods of internationalist self-confidence, its internal
tensions have been a great resource. It has been precisely international law’s ability to
marshal a range of seemingly conflicting ideas about personal and collective identity and

I have explored this phenomenon in detail in Legitimacy through Defiance: From Goa to Iraq, 23 Wisc.
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about local and international political order that has enabled it to create its most
audacious experiments. The boldest of these experiments include the international
regimes to settle nationalist conflicts ranging from Upper Silesia, 1923, to Kosovo, 1999.
A close study of such cases show internationalists’ efforts at dynamically achieving and
reachieving legitimacy – through continually persuading relevant publics that the
internationally sponsored regime was producing an evolving and coherent whole out of
its heterogeneous elements in response to the changing exigencies of the local situation.
These kinds of local, provisional successes established the identity of internationalism as
a whole, not as that of a system with a fixed ideology, but as a work-in-progress, subject
to constant revision through situational engagement. The revisability of these
experiments was made possible precisely by the heterogeneity of their elements, by the
fact that no one configuration was logically inevitable. To be sure, this revisability also
meant that power could never be finally integrated into principle, because principle was
in the process of constant, and contestable, permutation.
A feature of such situational attempts to achieve legitimacy is a third kind of
legitimacy problem, beyond status and coherence. Precisely at the moment of its
successes, internationalism has been haunted by the specters of its discredited pasts,
exercises of internationalist power that have been more or less thoroughly delegitimated.
During the long post-1989 decade, this kind of legitimacy problem took the form of the
resurgence in public debate of nearly forgotten historical terms: terms like trusteeship,
protectorate, proconsul, even recolonization. These terms were deployed by both
detached observers and committed partisans of the post-1989 experiments in bold
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internationalism: at times with the knowing wink of the ironist, at times the high tones of
the pedant, at times the angry polemics of the militant.
Though lacking the overtness of systematic opposition and the shrewdness of
internal critique, the resurgence of these historical references insidiously gnaws away at
internationalist legitimacy. It tarnishes the cutting-edge ventures of internationalist
idealism by pairing them with delegitimated forms of outdated power. Indeed, the long
post-Cold War decade seems to have forced us to frankly confront the relationship
between international law’s two famously contradictory talents: making the world safe
for the exercise of power and making the world safe for the highest ideals of humanity.
At least after Kosovo, no one engaged in internationalist theory or practice could deny
that power and idealism were thoroughly intertwined, that pure idealism and pure
realpolitik had become equally quixotic aspirations. Talk about the enforcement of
human rights seemed to inevitably evoke talk about proconsuls and protectorates; talk
about strategic projection of power seemed to inevitably evoke talk about international
legality and crosscultural understanding. What once seemed like international law’s past
(colonial or quasi-colonial institutions and doctrines) and what seemed like its future
(human rights and community) now seemed destined to haunt each other.
I think that this third challenge to internationalist legitimacy is a salutary element
in the dynamics of legitimacy that I am emphasizing here. The inevitable haunting of
internationalism by the specters of its unsavory past makes any final achievement of
legitimacy impossible, and forces internationalists to continually seek to prove their
differentiation from those specters. Rather than dream of a final integration of power by
principle, I propose that we continually goad power-holders by comparing them to those
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in the past who are now viewed as unprincipled. Depriving those with power of any
secure legitimacy should spur them on to avoid words and deeds deserving of the most
ignominious illegitimacy.
This paper, then, seeks to understand international law’s attempts to achieve
legitimacy in response to three kinds of challenges – attacks on the status of its identity,
critiques of the coherence of its words as well as its deeds, and attempts to associate it
with specters from its unsavory past.

II. Status
In one of his video pronouncements not long after September 11th, 2001, Osama
bin Laden made a bid to be the theorist of a new attack on the status of internationalism.
In this speech, he opposed “international legitimacy” to an incompatible and superior
legitimacy.

Those who claim that they are the leaders of the Arabs and continue to appeal to
the United Nations have disavowed what was revealed to Prophet Muhammad,
God's peace and blessings be upon him.

Those who refer things to the international legitimacy have disavowed the
legitimacy of the Holy Book and the tradition of Prophet Muhammad, God's
peace and blessings be upon him.11

11

Bin Laden, supra note 2.
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To be sure, this seems a weak bid, at a theoretical level – relying on a set of
clichéd oppositions between secular law and religion, between international institutions
and those of a particular tradition, between self-proclaimed leaders and their authentic
counterparts, and so on. Nevertheless, the challenge made up in obsessional
comprehensiveness what it lacked in theoretical subtlety. In this rather lengthy
manifesto, Bin Laden gave an overarching interpretation of the far-flung events of the
long post-Cold War decade under the single theme of the oppression of “Islam” by the
“West.” Somalia, Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, even poor East Timor:
Bin Laden cited all these disparate conflicts only in order to subsume them under his one
grand theme. The manifesto sought to delegitimate activist internationalism in all its
forms – describing actions undertaken in the name of internationalist principles, such as
the interventions in Somalia and East Timor, as mere acts of power by “Crusader forces.”
Even leaving aside this last, atavistic reference, bin Laden’s narrative was
ambitious in historical scope. Reaching beyond the 1990s to the twentieth century as a
whole, he declared: “Following World War I, which ended more than 83 years ago, the
whole Islamic world fell under the crusader banner.”12 With this quite specific historical
frame, Bin Laden proposed nothing less than a systematic challenge to the entirety of
modern internationalism. For the origins of internationalism’s proudest achievements –
including human rights, self-determination, and international institutions – lie precisely in
its renewal at the end of World War I, exactly 83 years prior to bin Laden’s speech.
In thinking about current responses to this latest attack on the status of
internationalism, it is useful to compare them with responses to the two other most
prominent attacks of this kind: the Fascist/Nazi challenge and the Communist/Soviet
12
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challenge. These three challenges were radically different in political intent and
historical context. Nevertheless, they share a set of formal similarities, among them a
broad contempt for the legitimacy of the prevailing form of internationalism, a desire to
unmask the self-proclaimed universal as particular, and a bid to establish an alternative
international political identity with global aspirations, such as the German Reich or the
Communist International.
The Fascist and Communist challenges prompted a variety of responses from
legal internationalists, responses which may be divided into three broad categories: the
purist responses, the alternative community responses, and the higher law responses.
Each of these responses has had its counterparts in recent years, coming into prominence
with Kosovo, but accelerating after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq.
The purist responses consisted simply in the reassertion of the dignity and validity
of international law and internationalist principles in the face of attacks and distortions by
their enemies. Purism came in many political stripes, from mainstream treatises to
Popular Front manifestoes. For example, after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, a group of
right-wing French intellectuals issued a pro-Italian “Manifesto in Defense of the West,”
mocking the League of Nations’ “false juridical universalism.”13 In response, a group of
leftist and liberal intellectuals responded, not with an equally politicized diatribe, but
rather, with a “Manifesto for the Respect of International Law.”14 Among other things,
this manifesto defended the League of Nations, which at that “very hour” was “justifying
its existence in the eyes of all men of good will” – surely a formalist assertion in 1935 if
ever there was one. The “falseness” of the League’s universality in 1935, like that of the
Manifesto for the Defense of the West, Le Temps (October 4, 1935), at 1 (all translations mine unless
otherwise noted).
14
Manifesto for the Respect of International Law, Le Populaire (October 5, 1935) at 1.
13
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United Nations in the first half of 2003, was undeniable as an empirical matter – whether
or not that universalism could be defended as a matter of normative purism.
The alternative community responses were more complex and took a variety of
forms. In the face of undeniable ideological division, they accepted that internationalist
norms and institutions could not simply claim universal status. Rather, they frankly made
a claim to the creation of partial international communities to replace the fractured
universal community. Often this kind of effort involved favorably contrasting the
antiformalist stance of the alternative community with the legal formalism of the
prevailing system.
For example, some justified Munich, 1938, as the site of a concrete grappling with
real problems, bypassing the formalistic impasses of the League. Such commentators
argued that an international conclave embodying the “spirit of Geneva”15 had transpired
in Munich, while only international law’s dead letter remained in Switzerland. A similar
discourse had begun to develop in 1935 to justify Franco-British plans to make a deal
with Italy on Ethiopia.16 In both of these cases, the alternative international community,
though partial, united ideological allies and adversaries: the French, British, and
Germans in Munich, the French, British, and Italians in the Ethiopia negotiations.
A different variant of the alternative community response focuses not on an
informal coalition between ideological adversaries, but on an overt presentation of an

An Overshadowed Assembly, Editorial, Times of London, (October 3, 1938) at 5.
For some versions of these plans, See Summary of the Franco-British Suggestions, 16 League of Nations
O. J. 1620 (August 1935); Note of the Committee of Five to the Ethiopian and Italian Representatives,
September 1935, in Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (ed.), Documents Relating to the
Italo-Ethiopian Conflict 54 (1936); Text of the Suggestions for an Agreed Settlement of the Conflict,
December, 1935, in Id., at 173. See also the ambivalent response of leading international lawyers to the
proposals, for example, Georges Scelle, La Politique extérieure française et la S.D.N., 10 Année politique
française et étrangère, 292-293 (1935); Charles Rousseau, Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien (ch. III), 45 Revue
Générale de droit international public, 61-62 (1938).
15
16

14

(c) Nathaniel Berman: Draft 2/10/2006 : not for general circulation

ideological alliance as the true internationalist community, even if non-universal. This
strategy was most fully deployed during the Cold War. The Soviets and the Americans
each presented their respective partisan alliances as embodying true internationalism, at
the expense of a U.N. viewed as either paralyzed or under the sway of the ideological
adversary.17 In these cases, the alternative community was a select group of states united
by substantive values, as opposed to the merely formally grounded – and merely
numerically universal – United Nations. A somewhat weaker form of this variant
developed in the aftermath of Munich, in which some in France sought to forsake the
irremediable fractures of Europe in favor a “repli impérial” – not so much an assertion
that the French empire represented the interests of the whole world, but that the empire,
rather than Europe, constituted the center of gravity of the French world.18
These alternative community responses were very elaborate precursors to the
“illegal-yet-legitimate” school of international lawyers in response to the Kosovo
intervention19 – and the far smaller “illegal-yet-legitimate” school in response to the
invasion of Iraq.20 In fact, one can divide the recent “illegal-yet-legitimate” responses in
three groups, each with analogies to their historical precursors. Some versions resembled
17

Compare the U.S. justification of the invasion of the Dominican Republic, 1965, with the Soviet
justification of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968. See Leonard Meeker, The Dominican Situation in
International Law, 53 Dep’t of State Bull. 60 (1965); Pravda article on Czechoslovakia, 7 Int’l. Legal
Mat., 1323 (1968). The U.S. justification relied heavily on the O.A.S., as an international community based
on the substantive value of anticommunism; the Soviet justification relied heavily on the Warsaw Pact, as a
community based on the substantive value of Marxism-Leninism. Both at least implicitly acknowledged
the formal illegality of their actions under the Charter. It should perhaps be noted here that the “United
Nations” originated as such a partial international community: the coalition of forces arrayed against the
Axis Powers.
18
See, e.g., an editorial in the newspaper, La République, published a short time after Munich. Under the
title, From Munich to Our Colonial Empire, the editorial declared: "Our own Central Europe is the African
continent. Our country is too great for quarrels between Germans and Slavs ever-resurgent in the Balkans."
Quoted in Charles-Robert Ageron, A propos d'une prétendu politique de ‘repli impérial’ dans la France
des années 1938-1939, 12 Revue d'histoire maghrebine, 225 (1978).
19
See, e.g., The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 186 (2000).
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See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., International Herald
Tribune, 19 March 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/90176.html.
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the Munich/Ethiopia method of constructing a pragmatic community of ideologically
disparate states, a community which claims to embody the spirit of the formally legal
institutions, while bypassing their procedures. Other versions resembled the Cold War
Warsaw Pact/NATO method of constructing a partial community grounded in particular
substantive values, designed to oppose an ideological adversary. In the case of Kosovo,
the question of what kind of alternative community should replace the U.N. partly
depended on individual publicists’ attitude towards Russia: a state seen by some as
amenable to pragmatic cooperation, while viewed by others as the potential leader of
some vaguely perceived pan-Slavic ideology. Finally, the valorizations of an “American
empire” heard in some U.S. policymaking quarters as the long decade ended, and
particularly after September 11th, may be viewed as an assertion that the U.S. is the true
embodiment of internationalism in our time, however few its allies – or as simply a repli
impérial in the French style. “Illegal-yet-legitimate” justifications of the U.S. invasion
have thus sometimes taken the form of presenting the U.S. as the only effective agency of
the true internationalist interest, an interest impeded and betrayed by the majority of the
U.N., and have sometimes taken the form of presenting U.S. policy as a repli Américain,
directed at safeguarding primarily the ideals of an American sphere of influence.
A third kind of response to the Fascist and Communist challenges, the higher law
responses, consisted in attempts to surmount ideological division by hoisting law everfurther upwards to achieve a legitimate position above the fray. One can distinguish two
strands in these responses, the principled strand and the functionalist strand. The
principled variant seeks a set of principles, such as peace or minimal distributive fairness
among relevant states, which their proponents portray as transcending deep ideological
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divides. This variant played an important role in the discussions of “peaceful change” in
the 1930s, in reaction to the fascist/Nazi challenge. Of course, the transcendental
principles put forward were historically contingent, to put it mildly. Among the
principles of minimal distributive fairness at play in these discussions were notions about
a fair distribution of colonial possessions between the colonial “haves,” France and
Britain, and the colonial “have-nots,” Germany and Italy.21
The second, functionalist, strand seeks to ground the legitimacy of international
law in interests that states share by virtue of their common condition as states.22
Functionalist higher-law responses often argue for a long-term perspective. While
acknowledging that ideological differences may fracture the international community for
a while, they assert that the deeper interests that all states share will ultimately assert
themselves. The two strands of the higher-law responses, the principled strand and the
functionalist strand, are often interwoven in the work of a single author, together
bolstering the claim that a legitimate international law can be established despite the
appearance of a “divided world.”23
To summarize these three responses to attacks on internationalism’s status:
where the purist responses reassert a pristine, universal international law against a
deceitful double, and the alternative community responses accept the challenge of a
divided world by constructing a partial alternative to the formally universal community,
the higher law responsesseek to raise international law above the divided world and

See, e.g., F.H. Leitner, Les problèmes généraux du ‘Peaceful Change’, in Fédération universitaire
internationale, Problèmes du “Peaceful Change” 78 (1936); Joseph L. Kunz, The Problem of Revision in
International Law, 33 Am. J. Int’l L. 54 (1939).
22
See, e.g., Lissitzyn, supra note 7, pp. 68-69.
23
See, e.g., Cassesse supra note 7, pp. 123-164.
21
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establish a relegitimated, if thinner, internationalism, beyond the superficial fractures of a
given historical moment.
I would argue that none of these responses have been particularly persuasive in
the past. I would also argue that the danger that their weakness posed to international law
did not lie in its supposed need for an unassailable theoretical foundation. Rather, the
danger lay in the damage the ideological challenges posed to international law’s ability to
present itself as a unitary and legitimate authority able to persuasively and dynamically
reconfigure its heterogeneous internal elements to meet new local crises. For the Fascist
and Communist challenges coupled their systematic opposition with a kind of challenge
that the bin Laden-type opposition has not yet pursued, that of internal critique.

III. Coherence
One of the secrets of international law’s resilience over the past century has
resided in its productive use of the tension between the heterogeneous elements of its
doctrinal and institutional toolbox for responding to local conflicts. The elements of this
toolbox – sovereignty and self-determination, minority protection and individual rights,
local democracy and international tutelage, local and international tribunals, and so on –
have different and often incompatible historical and conceptual foundations. Yet, it is
precisely the fact that these legal tools do not cohere in any logically necessary fashion
that has permitted the best legal innovators to distribute them differently in individual
legal regimes, regimes that present themselves as custom-designed for the unique
exigencies of particular local conflicts. And as such situations evolve, it is precisely the
tensions between the legal tools that make possible the flexibility to redistribute their
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relative weight to meet changing needs – to re-achieve legitimacy through a new and
different coherence of the elements. International law’s strength in approaching local
conflicts thus does not depend on the provision of “clear mandates.”24 On the contrary, it
depends on complex, heterogeneously composed mandates – and on the presence of an
agile and legitimate implementer of those mandates, able to use the conflicts between the
elements of the international regime as a resource for responding to changing or
previously misunderstood features of the situation.
Nevertheless, the secret of international law’s resilience is also its Achilles heel.
The relative stability of the contents of this toolbox over the past century represents a
potential source of blindness for internationalism insofar as it leads decisionmakers to
place very different conflicts in similar conceptual frames. Equally dangerously, the
heterogeneity of the tools has served the goals of those who seek to subvert both the local
internationalist experiments and the system as a whole. The two major historical
challenges to legal internationalism, Fascism and Communism, drew much of their
strength from internally subverting the prevailing internationalism in particular cases –
exploiting the tensions between the elements in local internationalist experiments to
destroy the legitimacy of the prevailing internationalism as a whole.
Alongside their broad contempt for the system as a whole, these challenges thus
drew much of their resources in particular cases from that very system. They combined
external and internal critique, attacks on internationalism’s status and attacks on its
coherence. For example, the Italian claim to Ethiopia and the German claim to the
Sudetenland were justified in terms of some of the core (albeit heterogeneous) concepts

24

See contra Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“the Brahimi Report”) (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.
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of the Versailles settlement – self-determination for some groups, international tutelage
for other (“backward”) groups, and minority rights for still other groups.25 As a result,
elite opinionmakers in western Europe, including international lawyers, often found it
difficult to respond to these claims without conceding considerable conceptual and even
political ground – or, in the words of one contemporary observer, found it difficult to do
so “without belying themselves.”26 Thus, the Italians criticized the sovereignty of
Ethiopia on the grounds that it was just as “backward” and deserving of tutelage as
territories under League Mandate or the colonial rule of the British and French; they
claimed that the structure of the Ethiopian state flew in the face of the self-determination
or minority rights of the country’s non-Amharic peoples; and they claimed that Italian
rule would embody the principle of internationalist tutelage. Some prominent liberal
international lawyers found it difficult to defend the sovereignty of Ethiopia in light of
these other principles. Having conceded much on the terrain of coherence, they
responded on the terrain of status – contending that fascist Italy could not properly
represent the international community in the otherwise justified task of placing the
country under trusteeship. But the ideological divisions of the 1930s, and the
accompanying external attacks on the international system, meant that it was no longer
possible to achieve consensus on the identity of the true agents of the international
community.
Similar examples can be drawn from the history of Communist challenges to legal
internationalism. These included the early anticolonialism of left-wing Communists in
the 1920s, which coupled an internal attack on the prima facie racism of the unequal
25

I discuss this at length in Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism? Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, and
‘Peaceful Change,’ 6Nordic J . of In’l L. 421 (1996).
26
P. Teissonière, Faut-il résister aux violents? 49 La Paix par le Droit, 13 (1938).
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application of self-determination with an external attack on the League of Nations as an
“association of imperialist pirates.”27 Later examples include Soviet defenses of their
various unilateral interventions. These defenses, which mirrored U.S. justifications of
analogous interventions, exploited the tensions between prevailing international norms,
and linked this coherence challenge to an assertion about the status of the Warsaw Pact as
an alternative international community.28

Thus, over the course of nearly a century,

legal internationalists have been confounded not by totalizing rejections of their system
standing alone, but rather by the ability of the challengers to couple their ideological
rejection with internal critique.
The strength of such challenges was thus due to the fact that internationalism’s
resilience has not resided in purist obliviousness, Manichaean divisions between
competing international communities, or Herculean attainments of a higher law above
partisan conflict. Rather, it has consisted in Legal Realist-style exploitation of
contradictoriness and inconsistency as resources that facilitate case-specific complexity
and flexibility. The significance of past ideological attacks on the status of
internationalism as a whole stemmed from the damage they inflicted on internationalists’
authority to persuasively reconfigure their disparate legal concepts in response to
changing local conflicts – to establish new legitimacies of coherence. The challengers
attacked the particular configuration of international legal elements laid down for
particular conflicts by the prevailing international authorities; their external attacks
crippled the ability of those authorities to establish new configurations.

27
28

Quoted in Alan Rose, Surrealism and Communism, 132 (1991).
See Meeker and Pravda articles, supra note 17.
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Panicked responses to the current crisis in internationalist legitimacy, to the extent
that they are provoked solely by the prospect of a new totalizing rejection of the system,
are thus misplaced. Current status challenges, such as the Islamicist and U.S. challenges,
are likely to have a significant effect on activist internationalism only if the challengers
attempt to undermine the system from within as well as from without. Consider, for
example, the U.S. administration of Iraq, which lacks status legitimacy in the eyes of
most of the world. One could imagine a U.S. occupation authority that was able to
overcome its status illegitimacy and achieve a legitimacy of coherence through a skillful
deployment of the various elements in the international toolbox for local conflicts. Of
course, whether the actual U.S. administration of Iraq will ever be able to achieve
legitimacy in this way is, as of this writing, highly questionable.
Beyond the skill and intent of the American administrators, there are two key
obstacles. First, the high degree of status illegitimacy of the U.S. occupation makes the
actions of the American administrators suspect both locally and internationally.
Secondly, the U.S. justification of the invasion of Iraq involved not only an attack on the
status of internationalism embodied in the U.N., but also – at least in some official
pronouncements – a defiant attack on the coherence of international norms. The
pronouncements I have in mind are those that suggest that the U.S. was rejecting the
legitimacy of coherence by denigrating some principles at the expense of others, rather
than merely seeking a reconfiguration of their relative weights – in other words, making a
bid to achieve legitimacy through defiance. Bids for legitimacy through defiance frankly
seek approval for the boldness of their actions precisely by virtue of the fact that they
defy some prevailing norms. Such bids thus may be viewed as seeking a surplus
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legitimacy – attempting to use the very legitimacy- deficit of their actions as a basis for a
higher legitimacy.
A brief comparison between justifications of the use of force in Kosovo, 1999,
and Iraq, 2003, can illuminate the distinctiveness of bids for legitimacy through defiance.
Both uses of force were justified through exploiting the tensions between international
legal principles. The principles restricting the use of force stated in the Charter were
juxtaposed to principles permitting unilateral uses of force, such as humanitarian
intervention and expansive notions of self-defense, purportedly grounded in customary
law; the substantive obligations the Security Council imposed on particular states,
Yugoslavia and Iraq, were juxtaposed to the Council’s refusal to grant enforcement
authority to other states. Both Kosovo and Iraq thus implicated conflicts among
substantive principles, between treaty and custom, and between substance and procedure.
However, where the Kosovo justifications tended to make the effort to present a
competing configuration of the prevailing international requirements, some of the US
pronouncements on Iraq tended to denigrate, rather than reconfigure, the elements
disfavoring the intervention. NATO pronouncements on Kosovo, for example, tried to
show that the intervention represented a legitimate, even if novel, form of cooperation
between the UN and NATO. In Bruno Simma’s words:
Indeed, one is immediately struck by the degree to which the efforts of NATO
and its member states follow the "logic" of, and have been expressly linked to, the
treatment of the Kosovo crisis by the Security Council. In an address delivered in
Bonn on 4 February 1999, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott referred
to an "unprecedented and promising degree of synergy" in the sense that the UN
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and NATO, among other institutions, had "pooled their energies and strengths on
behalf of an urgent common cause"; as to the specific contribution of the UN, he
saw this in the fact that "the UN has lent its political and moral authority to the
Kosovo effort".29
Despite the seeming violation of formal legal norms in their accepted configuration,
NATO officials attempted to make their actions appear to conform to the logic of the
principles as a whole, once their relative authority had been reconfigured. In other
words, they tried to present an alternative legitimacy of coherence.
By contrast, many of the U.S. pronouncements prior to the invasion of Iraq
frankly declared American intentions to defy the prevailing international legal system.
The most overt example of this stance was provided by George W. Bush in declaring that
it was the UN that had to “to prove to the world whether it's going to be relevant or
whether it's going to be a League of Nations, irrelevant.”30 Bush thus made an open
challenge to the status of the UN, attacking the legitimacy of its identity.
However, his challenge was not limited to its status aspect. Rather, it also
focused on the coherence of the system’s internal normative elements, frankly rejecting
any obligation to accommodate them all. This aspect of the challenge frankly declared
American intentions to ignore some prevailing norms, rather than to reconfigure the
normative system. In particular, Bush attacked the UN’s purported unwillingness to
enforce the substantive obligations it had imposed on Iraq, and stressed the importance of
the substantive obligations at the expense of the procedural norms for enforcement.

Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 11 (1999).
Simma rejects the legal soundness of this position.
30
Bush, supra note 3.
29
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We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But
the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council
resolutions will be enforced – the just demands of peace and security will be met
– or action will be unavoidable.31
Bush was thus asserting that the U.S. would not be engaged in a simple act of flouting the
UN, as he might have if he were only attacking the status of the U.N. Rather, he
announced that the US would be upholding some of its norms at the expense of others –
linking his attack on the status of the U.N., its identity as an “irrelevant League of
Nations,” with an attack on the legitimacy of the coherence of its norms. And he sought
legitimacy for the US action precisely by virtue of its bold willingness to violate certain
norms, particularly procedural norms, in order to support others; this was a bid for a
surplus legitimacy for brash, taboo-breaking behavior by means of an attack on both the
status and coherence of the international system.
To be sure, this bid for legitimacy through defiance generally failed outside the
U.S. and the substantive case for the invasion was based on a mass of false factual
assertions. Nevertheless, it offers a clear example of such a bid. It is also important to
note that bids for legitimacy through defiance have come from across the political
spectrum at various times. There are few people who would not view them
sympathetically in at least some circumstance – except perhaps for formalists of the
“pereat mundus, fiat jus!” school.
In the particular situation of the U.S. in Iraq, however, this bid for legitimacy
through defiance has presented serious difficulties for its protagonist. As I have noted,
the U.S. lacks international status legitimacy in Iraq due to the failure of its bid to secure
31

Id.
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support for the invasion through defying the international system. In the years since the
invasion, it has tried to achieve a legitimacy of coherence by attempting to show the
implementation of widely shared international values in its conduct of the occupation.
Yet, the pre-war U.S. attack on the coherence of international norms, as well as on the
status of international institutions, have made its bids for a new legitimacy of coherence
very fragile. Having sought a surplus legitimacy for its coherence-defying action in
invading Iraq, it has been ill-equipped to seek the legitimacy of coherence in its selfproclaimed role as internationalist administrator of that country.

Nor has the actual

conduct of the American occupation of Iraq come close to providing the factual basis for
such a legitimacy bid.

IV. “Our Law”: Producing Unity through Heterogeneity
I have argued that the secret of internationalism’s resilience over the past century
has resided in its productive use of the tension between the heterogeneous elements of its
doctrinal and institutional toolbox for responding to local conflicts. To portray a
successful example of the production of legitimacy out of disparate concepts, I turn in
this section to an incident from the early days of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It
is in such attempts to manage local crises that the alchemy of international coordination
of heterogeneous concepts can be seen in action. And yet, it is precisely here, when the
alchemy has worked its unifying magic, that international law rediscovers its unsettling
historical doubles – internationalist regimes doubled by the word “protectorate”,
internationalist administrators doubled by the word “proconsul”.
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The incident to which I turn presents a striking allegory of the dynamics of
situational legitimacy, the provisional construction of internationalism in a particular
context out of heterogeneous conceptions and practices. This incident was widely
reported in the elite Western press, exemplified by this symptomatic accountin Le
Monde:

“A new Kosovo is beginning; we have changed the law”, declared Mr. Kouchner
to the judges and journalists who surrounded him at the meeting. It had been
convened, they explain at UNMIK, after a cascade of resignation threats by those
who formed the nucleus of the new “independent and multiethnic” judicial system
of Kosovo. A week ago, three judges from Prizren launched the movement. They
rejected Section 3 of “Regulation 1” (signed by Mr. Kouchner on July 25th to
define his own powers), which declared that “The laws applicable in the territory
of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as
they do not conflict with [internationally recognized human rights standards].” A
campaign was then launched by the KLA against what it interpreted as the
maintenance in Kosovo of Yugoslav laws which were, in fact if not always in the
text, an instrument of Serb repression in the province. Judges were then
subjected to pressures to resign. Nipping this offensive in the bud, Bernard
Kouchner apologized before 50 of the judges for having “insufficiently consulted
them, especially before publishing Regulation 1.” Assuring them that his mission
is to “permit the emergence of an autonomous administration”, he promised not
to take any further decisions without “involving the people of Kosovo.” A
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working group, joined by international experts, will draft the law of Kosovo –
“our law, which is neither Serb nor Yugoslav,” he emphasized. This work will be
coordinated with the Council of Europe, which is supposed to present a first
“purge” of existing laws at the end of September. ... The great majority of judges
declared themselves satisfied with the statements of the U.N. “proconsul” and
promised to get to work to rapidly fill the legal void that has prevented the trials –
but not the detention – of hundreds of people already arrested by KFOR in
Kosovo.32

One would have had to invent this story if it hadn’t been conveniently reported in
the press. This real-life allegory contains all the quandaries of the robust internationalism
of the long post-1989 decade. A U.N. administration established itself in a territory on
the basis of a use of force of controversial legality. The appointment of a famous
humanitarian as the head of the territorial administration symbolized the internationalist
desire to transmute this questionable force into legitimate law, to absorb power into
principle. In accordance with this desire, Kouchner’s first act was to attempt this
transmutation by establishing a legal framework “to define his own powers.” This act
was particularly urgent since KFOR, itself already an internationalist transmutation of
NATO, had arrested hundreds of people outside of a legal framework. The “new
beginning of Kosovo,” declared Kouchner, was not the NATO intervention, but the fact
that “we have changed the law” – a pronouncement that was not an observation of fact,
but rather, a bid for the construction of legitimacy.

Vers une ‘loi du Kosovo,’ ni serbe ni yougoslave,” Le Monde, 17 August 1999 (emphasis in the
original).

32
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Yet, the question of what constituted legitimate legal change turned out to be a
highly contestable matter. Kouchner appears to have first conceived his task as a matter
of legal technique, the establishment of a neutral legal framework to permit the work of
his administration to begin. He sought to achieve this goal by declaring that “law”
would now prevail over military force and by subjecting domestic law to the test of
international human rights standards. In defining the meaning of “law” as the law in
effect before the start of the exercise of NATO power,33 he chose the seemingly neutral
approach of legal continuity, the protection of acquired rights. The KLA and its allied
judges, in response, challenged the notion that the question of a rule of “law” was simply
a technical matter. By asserting that this “law” had a partisan identity, that of Serbian
supremacy, they rejected the neutrality of legal continuity. Nor were they satisfied with
the purging filter of international standards, seeking, instead, a total rejection of the
illegitimate Yugoslav legal source. Indeed, Kouchner’s law, which pretended to the
neutral identity of impartial technique, became for them a mere tributary of this partisan
source.
This kind of attack on internationalist legitimacy may be interpreted as
proceeding from an internal critique of the coherence of the elements of the Kosovo
regime to an external critique of its identity. The internal critique was aimed at
Kouchner’s initial configuration of the famously conflicting elements in the UNMIK
mandate: embodied in Resolution 1244’s call for: 1) “the sovereignty… of Yugoslavia” ;
2) “autonomy and … self-administration for Kosovo,”; and 3) administration by
33

The relevant portion of Regulation 1 reads: “The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24
March 1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with [internationally
recognized human rights standards], the fulfilment of the mandate given to UNMIK under United Nations
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), or the present or any other regulation issued by UNMIK.”
UNMIK/REG/1999/1 Section 3 (25 July 1999).
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“international civil and security presences.”34 Given the many tensions latent in this
multiple mandate, Regulation 1’s provision banning legal rules incompatible with
Resolution 1244 (in addition to those that conflicted with international human rights
standards) provided ample room for internal critique from almost any perspective. The
Albanian opposition rejected the version of coherence among 1244’s elements embodied
in Regulation 1’s stance of technical legal neutrality. It accompanied this critique of
Regulation’s 1 bid for a legitimacy of coherence with an alternative bid for a legitimacy
of defiance – rejecting the notion that the principle of Yugoslav sovereignty should play
any role at all. Finally, it implicitly delegitimated Kouchner’s internationalist status as a
whole, accusing it of partiality, demoting him from his identity above the fray to that of
merely one player in the conflict.
While one may only imagine his private frustration, Kouchner’s admirable public
recovery from this snafu shows that he understood precisely what was involved. Without
internationalist status legitimacy, the delicate work of coordination among conflicting
groups, let alone legal concepts, would be impossible. He immediately set about,
therefore, to ground his authority in a different concept of legitimacy than the one with
which he began his tenure. By reshaping his internationalist identity, he sought to
relegitimate his status, thus making it possible for him to proceed with the work of
reconfiguring the elements of the internationalist regime for Kosovo and make a new bid
for a legitimacy of coherence.
Gathering the Albanian judges, he made an explicit appeal for an alliance with
them. This appeal involved a different identity for international authority – no longer
that of neutral technocracy, but rather, that of an ally, however asymmetrical, with a
34

U.N. S.C. Res. 1244, S/RES/1244 (1999).
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deserving population. He apologized for his failure to consult and promised henceforth
to “involve the people” – hardly necessary measures when he had conceived the matter at
hand as merely technical. He encapsulated his new stance in his declaration that the law
to be drafted would be “our law, which is neither Serb nor Yugoslav.”
A thought-provoking and ambivalent phrase. For if the “our” in “our law”
referred to the pure universality of internationalism (the royal “our”), one would have
rather expected the rest of the phrase to read “neither Serb nor Albanian” – i.e., it would
be a neutral law, not ethnically marked. By contrast, “neither Serb nor Yugoslav” might
suggest that it would be Albanian. This would suggest that Kouchner was abandoning a
bid for a universalist internationalism in favor of a partial community that frankly
acknowledged its partiality. Yet, if Kouchner were purporting to be speaking solely as
the representative of the Albanians, then the “our” would have been sufficient – the
“neither ... nor” phrase would seem a bit like protesting too much. In fact, the very
structure of the phrase “neither ... nor” evoked impartiality, even though the terms that
followed those conjunctions partly confounded that evocation.
The ambivalences of his phrase, I would argue, suggest that Kouchner sought to
achieve his legitimacy by doing something other than asserting either neutrality or
partisan identity. Rather, Kouchner’s “our” strove to effect a complex alliance of two
seemingly conflicting sources of legitimacy, that of overarching international authority
and that of Albanian nationalism. He sought to achieve his legitimacy through a
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paradoxical alliance between the two – an internationalism that wagers its legitimacy on
its ability to respond to the deepest needs of nationalist partisans.35
At least in this crisis, Kouchner apparently succeeded. By reshaping the identity
of his internationalism, he made credible his pledge to reconfigure the conflicting internal
elements of the legal regime called for by Resolution 1244. The mass resignation of the
judges was averted.
Kouchner eventually repealed Regulation 1, replacing it with Regulation 24. The
new Regulation provided that Kosovo would be governed by the law in effect before
March 22nd, 1989 – i.e., the law that prevailed during the period of Kosovo’s autonomy
within Serbia. This 1989 law cannot be said to be “neither Serb nor Yugoslav” in a pure
sense. Regulation 24 can, however, be seen as a reconfiguration of the internally
heterogeneous mandate of Resolution 1244. “Our law,” as embodied in Regulation 24,
would be neither solely Yugoslav nor solely Albanian – nor solely international. Rather,
it would be a new configuration of conflicting elements, a new appeal for legitimacy
made to the relevant publics.
To be sure, as Kouchner discovered, identifying the relevant publics may be a
tricky matter to achieve in advance. Kouchner may have thought his public was a
community of lawyers, perhaps international, perhaps Yugoslav, perhaps Kosovar. He
may have thought his public was the UNMIK staff or the NGO world. He discovered,
through its resistance, that a key relevant public was the organized sphere of Kosovar
nationalism.

35

I have explored this “alliance” in detail elsewhere. See, e.g., ‘But the Alternative is Despair’:
European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1792
(1993).
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Conversely, as this example shows, the relevant public may only discover itself
through finding itself addressed by an act of internationalist power. One might imagine
that some of the Albanian judges may have shared a technocratic idea about the rule of
law until finding themselves jolted by the reinstatement of Yugoslav law – or by finding
themselves jolted by pressure from the KLA. Finally, internationalist actors themselves
may only discover their full identity through this dynamic. Kouchner was undoubtedly
more surprised than anyone to discover his identity as a Serb puppet (that is, in the eyes
of the KLA) and to be obliged to reconstruct his identity as an ally (however provisional
and asymmetrical) of Albanian nationalism.
Internationalist actors like Kouchner must, therefore, necessarily take the risk of
appealing for legitimacy without a guarantee of success or even certainty about the
addressees of their appeals. And with each new fragile configuration of conflicting
elements, the cycle can always begin again, as new challenges unsettle the provisional
equilibrium among the regime’s elements. Legitimacy must be continually reachieved–
and each new achievement will be a new configuration of those elements.
Finally, at the very hour of his success, Kouchner managed to evoke a different
kind of legitimacy-trouble. For in reporting the result of this speech, Le Monde tells us
that the “great majority of judges declared themselves satisfied with the statements of the
U.N. ‘proconsul’.” Try as he might to ally himself with the Albanians, Kouchner could
not shake off another doubling of his role as legitimate international authority: this time
not by the image of him as a Yugoslav proxy, but as an imperial “proconsul.” The term
“proconsul” may be one the Albanians would have used or it may reflect Le Monde’s
elite irony about internationalist idealism. But it suggests the impossibility of any
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definitive achievement of internationalist legitimacy. International humanitarian,
Albanian ally, or imperial “proconsul”? Kouchner’s variable ability to govern Kosovo,
the changing measure of his legitimacy, depended on his ability to recognize these
doublings of legitimacy and on his ability to shift among their attendant roles.
The “Our Law” allegory presents the construction of legitimacy out of the shifts
between its conflicting identities and elements diachronically, in terms of a dynamic
unfolding. The UNMIK-promulgated Constitution of Kosovo (2001),36 by contrast,
presents this kind of construction in the form of a synchronic legal structure.

This

Constitution follows in the great tradition of internationalist attempts to resolve
nationalist conflict through complex legal experiments, a tradition whose illustrious
precursors include the interwar regimes for Upper Silesia, Danzig and the Saar, the
Palestine Partition Resolution of 1947, and the Washington and Dayton Accords for
Bosnia in the 1990s – composite regimes, at once local and international, designed for the
pacification of seemingly intractable conflict.
Among the features shared by these experiments, I would like to designate two
here. First, they create a legal space for themselves by bracketing the question of
sovereignty, either by explicitly deferring the question to a later time (the Saar and
Kosovo), superimposing a unified, experimental regime on top of sovereign divisions
(Upper Silesia, Palestine), or creating a novel a-sovereign entity (Danzig).37

Secondly,

they seek to achieve their goals of resolving nationalist conflict by juxtaposing, in a
single legal regime, elements that seem to be incompatible, or at least that stand in

36

“Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government,” UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (15 May 2001),
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm.
37
See ‘But the Alternative is Despair’: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of
International Law, supra note 35, at 1874-1897.
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tension with each other. The competing elements may include partition (between
sovereigns or ethnic units) and unity (economic or political), minority rights and
individual rights, universal suffrage and representation based on ethnic identity, local
judiciary and on-site international or mixed courts.
The tension among the elements that compose such regimes arises from the
implicit reference each makes to distinct notions of personal and collective identity, as
well as distinct ideas about political organization. At least since the end of World War I,
such regimes have wagered their legitimacy on the notion that a high level of legal
complexity is needed to match the level of the complexity of the local conflict.
Legitimacy would be attained when such complex and heterogeneous constructions could
prove their ability both to pacify nationalist conflict and to provide all nationalist factions
with a sense that their deepest longings have been satisfied. The legitimacy of any
particular such regime, their proponents have contended, would emerge out of a suitable
configuration of the conflicting concepts and institutions in the international toolbox.
Thus, paradoxically, the advocates of such regimes have believed that only a
configuration of conflicting legal elements can achieve legitimacy in such conflicts. In
my studies of the interwar period,38 I have used the phrase “Modernist faith” to describe
this paradoxical set of beliefs – a faith, now over 83 years old, rightly perceived by
challengers such as bin Laden as a rival to their own faith. The structure of Modernist
faith shows the importance of the two dimensions of legitimacy I have highlighted thus
far: 1) a situational legitimacy of coherence, i.e., recognition by relevant publics that
regimes embodying particular configurations of the conflicting elements in the
38

See id.. See also Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of
Reconstruction, in Michael Loriaux & Cecilia Lynch (eds.), Law and Moral Action in World
Politics, (1999).
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international toolbox constitute a good response to local exigencies; and 2) status
legitimacy, i.e., recognition by relevant publics of the good title to “internationalism” of
the authority constructing and administering such regimes.
Following in this tradition, the Kosovo Constitution rests on the suspension of the
question of sovereignty. It combines a variety of heterogeneous elements, which
implicitly refer to distinct, and potentially conflicting, ideas of identity. Such elements
include individual human rights and a variety of institutionalizations of the rights of
“Communities,” defined by ethnic, religious or linguistic identity.39 Such “Community”
rights include very robust versions of the kinds of rights originally developed to protect
“minorities” in a variety of international instruments since 1919. In relation to the long
historical debate about whether minority rights should focus more on groups or
individuals,40 the Kosovo Constitution opts in several specific ways for group-centered
provisions for the region’s “Communities.” For example, rather than simply providing
for non-interference with group educational institutions, it mandates public funding of
“Community” schools. More strikingly, the Constitution reserves seats for nonAlbanians in the Assembly.41 It also provides for a complicated procedure, related to
provisions in the Bosnia accords, whereby members of a “Community” in the Assembly
may temporarily block legislation that they declare violates the “vital interests of the
Community.”42 The Constitution declares membership in a Community to be a wholly
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voluntary matter and non-membership to bring no “disadvantage”.43 Yet, it is clear from
these provisions that non-participation in Communities could “disadvantage” a Kosovar
in the distribution of economic and political power – just one example of how the
individualist and “Community” strands in the document stand in very concrete tension.
The Constitution’s judicial framework also juxtaposes ethnic-based and
internationalist conceptions of a proper judiciary. The Consitution provides for both
international and local judges.44 The identity of the local judges should “reflect the
diversity of the people of Kosovo.”45 The Constitution leaves latitude in the hands of the
Special Representative of the Secretary General to determine the number of international
judges and the criteria for their appointment.46 The balance between the competing
elements in these provisions leaves room for reconfiguration aimed at achieving
legitimacy among the various relevant constituencies. Such reconfiguration has occurred
a number of times, including the incident with the Albanian judges described in detail
above. In a very different vein, a November 2001 Yugoslav-UNMIK agreement47
provided for increasing the number of international judges (especially for “inter-ethnic”
cases) and of ethnic Serb judges.
In the history of such local, yet international, regimes, the unity of the complex
legal construction may have an on-site human or institutional embodiment, such as the
Governing Commission of the Saar. In other regimes, such as Upper Silesia, the unity
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may simply be intended to emerge from the relation between the elements, often
ultimately placed under the distant authority of the Councils of the League or of the U.N.
In either case, the unity of the regime as a whole may stand in tension with the
constitutive parts. In Kosovo, supreme authority is vested in the Special Representative
of the Secretary General, whose authority is not “affect[ed] or diminish[ed]”48 by the
Constitutionally established institutions – which are nonetheless intended to be precisely
those of “self-government.”
Despite this ultimate tension, the entire document, with all its heterogeneities,
expresses the classic Modernist faith: the composite regime seeks to respond to “the
legitimate aspirations of the people of Kosovo to live in freedom, in peace, and in
friendly relations with other people in the region.” The legitimacy of any particular
regime of this sort depends on its ability to persuade others, both the conflicting local
populations and the international community, of the validity of Modernist faith in its
particular configuration of conflicting principles – and on its ability to emulate Kouchner
in a flexible willingness to reconfigure them if necessary. This ability depends on the
agility of the embodiment of international authority in the particular situation, as well as
on the status legitimacy of internationalism in the world generally.
Nevertheless, as we saw in the “Our Law” allegory, even at the hour of the
success of such endeavors, the entire complex structure remains haunted by the specter of
those disconcerting words: protectorate, proconsul. The shrewd role shifts of Kouchner,
the skillful balancing of the Constitution – all this hard-won legitimacy is unable to shake
off its disconcerting double. In the next section of this paper, I turn to face this double
more directly.
48
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V. Coming to Terms with the Past: The Specter of Fez

On March 30, 1912, the French Republic and the Moroccan Sultan concluded the
Treaty of Fez, with the goal of “establishing a well-r egulated regime” in Morocco.49 The
treaty provided for the military occupation of Morocco by France.50 The “new regime”
envisioned by the treaty would include “administrative, judicial, educational, economic,
financial, and military reforms which the French Government shall judge useful to
introduce on Moroccan territory.”51 This regime would “safeguard the religious
situation, the traditional respect and prestige of the Sultan, and the exercise of the Muslim
religion and religious institutions”.52 France also agreed “to provide constant support to
his Cherifian Majesty against any danger which might threaten his person or his throne or
which might compromise the tranquility of his State.”53 Finally, the treaty provided that
France would “be represented before his Cherifian Majesty by a Resident General
Commissioner, in whom shall be vested all the powers of the Republic in Morocco, and
who shall safeguard the execution of the present agreement.”54 In short: France
established a protectorate over Morocco.
On June 10, 1999, the Security Council passed resolution 1244 relating to
Kosovo.55 In the resolution, the Security Council “b[ore] in mind the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the
49
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Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.”56 It declared
itself “[d]etermined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and
displaced persons to their homes.”57 The resolution provided for an international military
presence and civil administration in Kosovo.58 The goals of this international presence in
Kosovo would be overseeing and reestablishing basic governmental functions,
humanitarian assistance, democratization, institution-building, and economic
reconstruction. Finally, the resolution provided for the appointment of “a Special
Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and
further request[ed] the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to
coordinate closely with the international security presence”.59 One could easily say that,
in short, the resolution provided for the establishment of a protectorate over Kosovo.
Indeed, the irony and quotation marks which attended the use of the word “protectorate”
in the first year of debate about UNMIK gradually disappeared as time went on.
What is the relationship between these two documents? We could list their
similarities. These would include: a) the recitation of international ideals – in Fez, that
of a “well-regulated regime”; in 1244, that of international peace and security; b) military
occupation – in Fez, by France; in 1244, by the international security presence; c) the
bracketing of sovereignty – in Fez, by maintaining the nominal sovereignty of the
Moroccan Sultan; in 1244, that of Yugoslavia; d) farreaching internal reforms
undertaken by the Protector – in Fez, administrative, educational, economic; in 1244,
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adminstrative economic, political, civil; e) the explicit provisions for human rights – in
Fez, in the form of Muslim religious liberty; in 1244, in the form of broad human rights;
f) ambiguity about the ultimate goal of the protectorate – in Fez, between annexation by
France and ultimate independence for a modernized Moroccan state; in 1244, between
the restoration of Yugoslav sovereignty and ultimate independence for Kosovo; and g)
the vesting of supreme power in a representative of the Protector – in Fez, the French
Resident-General; in 1244, the Special Representative of the Secretary General.60
But we could also list their differences. Such differences would in part reside in
the source of the legitimacy of the documents, in particular their relative position on the
axes of sovereign consent and international community authority. On the one hand, the
protectorate instrument is in the form of a treaty, a nominally consensual document,
while the Security Council resolution is in the form of a mandatory resolution under
Chapter VII. Yet it is important not to overstate the starkness of this contrast. While
Resolution 1244 is in the form of a Chapter VII resolution, it also recites the consent by
Yugoslavia to the principles contained in the G-8 document of May 1999 and the EU
document of June 2nd, 1999.61 Conversely, while the protectorate document is in the
form of a treaty, it was the culmination of steady military and political encroachment by
France.
Moreover, both documents seek to ground the legitimacy of their entire structure
in a set of substantive international values. The French protectorate treaty recites the
principles of what we would today call “good governance” as the goal of the treaty;
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moreover, the French elsewhere described the “lofty aims of the protectorate, . . . [as]
above all a work of civilization, . . . a matter in which all [nations] have an equal
interest”62 – the functional historical equivalent to the more familiar recitation in 1244 of
“the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security.”
If we cannot read unequivocal differences between the two regimes off the text of
their founding documents, we probably need to look elsewhere. That elsewhere would
include the political intent and historical context in which the two regimes were
established. We would need to compare the political and economic motivations for the
French occupation of Morocco with those animating the NATO and UN occupation of
Kosovo. We would need to compare the substantive merit of the respective claims of
France and the Security Council to represent the international community. We would
need to look at the broader geopolitical context, particularly the outside powers that
France and NATO were trying to ward off from the two regions. And we might, in the
inevitably messy results of such multiple inquiries, arrive at a persuasive judgment of
relative legitimacy.
But this judgment would not reside in a clear characterization of UNMIK as
purely law and the French Protectorate as purely politics – a judgment that could only be
anachronistic. France justified its action on legal grounds that were relatively plausible in
1912, just as the U.N. justified its actions on legal grounds that were relatively plausible
in 1999. This is not to say that their relative legal plausibility, even in their respective
62
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contexts, was equivalent. But neither could we confidently assert a priori, without
detailed comparative analysis, that one regime would come out ahead.
Bracketing for a moment the formal legal issues, normative judgment of
international regimes should depend on an evaluation of the conception of the affected
population that animates them. In the interwar context, I have argued that international
lawyers viewed the nationalism to which their legal innovations responded as a
“primitive” force to be celebrated on account of its energy, and to be domesticated on
account of its dangerousness.63 This international legal “primitivism,” I argued,
embodied the same kind of fear and fascination exerted on many contemporaneous
cultural innovators by fantasies of racial, cultural, geographical, and sexual “Others.”
Much of Modernist creativity, across a range of domains – including art, music,
literature, and architecture, as well as law – emerged from attempts to link these
“primitives” with the most advanced technical innovations of the day.
The Modernists’ “primitivist” fantasies, of course, only had the most dubious
relationship with reality – except, perhaps, when these fantasies were internalized or
performed by the Modernists’ “Others.” Still, these fantasies were often an improvement
on colonial conceptions of the “native.” Often, though not always. In any case, though
this topic would require another paper, a comparative evaluation of regimes such as
UNMIK would have to look carefully at the conception of the affected populations
animating them – how they are imagined politically, economically, culturally, sexually,
and how that imagination may be embedded in the details of the legal regime.
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VI. Legitimation Effects: Four Hypotheses
I conclude with four hypotheses about the effect on legitimacy of the seemingly
unavoidable evocation by regimes such as UNMIK of the specters of protectorates and
colonies: the delegitimizing effects hypothesis, the legitimizing effects hypothesis, the
cautionary effects hypothesis, and the strategic effects hypothesis.
The delegitimizing effects hypothesis is that evocation of the colonial past has the
effect of an unmasking. In this view, audacious experiments like UNMIK purport to
implement the most advanced internationalist principles, but actually represent the
continuation or resurrection of colonial power in contemporary form. The claim of such
regimes to have thoroughly pressed power into the service of humanitarianism would
simply be an ideological cover for the reverse process. This kind of effect on legitimacy
would primarily concern the status of the international regime.
By contrast, the legitimizing effects hypothesis is that this evocation actually
serves to bolster the claims of these legal regimes. In this view, it is precisely their
ability to evoke the colonial past and to demonstrate their difference from it that gives
these regimes their distinctive legitimacy. To the extent that similarities exist, the
regimes’ advocates could contend, they stem from structural exigencies arising from any
administration of territory by the power of an outside authority. But, the advocates would
contend, it is the humanitarian manner in which such power is exercised and the goals for
which it is exercised that demonstrate the radical difference of such regimes from their
colonial counterparts – a demonstration of difference whose persuasive “edge” depends
precisely on the structural similarities. The evocation of colonialism would pose a high-
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stakes challenge to the regime to persuasively establish this differentiation. The
achievement of such a legitimizing effect would depend on the ability of the particular
international regime to demonstrate that the coherence of its elements prove its status
legitimacy as a whole – in other words, that its actual practices work in such a way as to
demonstrate that the regime as a whole is really “internationalist” and not “colonialist.”
The cautionary effects hypothesis looks at the association with colonialism as a
useful tool in the hands of friendly critics of these regimes – for example, sympathetic,
but wary, human rights NGOs. The association with colonialism would be a readily
available and widely comprehensible criticism that can be made every time the regime
threatens to step over the legitimate bounds of its powers. Such critics would be
deploying the critique of status legitimacy strategically, as a pressuring device to lobby
for a reconfiguration of the coherence of the regime’s elements.
The strategic effects hypothesis combines the first three. Like the cautionary
effects hypothesis, it sees the association with colonialism as a useful tool. But this
hypothesis would extend the range of players in whose hands the tool might be useful.
There might be times, for example, when the affected population may wish to deploy the
colonial association’s delegitimizing effect not because they wish to terminate the
regime, but rather, because they are engaged in a particular struggle over a particular
issue. There might even be times when the international authority might wish to affirm
the association with colonialism in a threatening manner, in order to command respect
from a variety of bad actors in the region who may be impervious to gentler, more
legitimate, arguments about the common good. (After all, if military force can
sometimes be appropriate, psychological force might also be.) And so on.
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From the perspective of the situational, political-historical approach to legitimacy
taken in this paper, each of these uses of the evocation of the colonial past might be
appropriate depending on the particularities of a given international regime and its
relation to the local conflict upon which it is deployed. Some regimes might, in fact, be
illegitimate exercises of power; others might be noble ventures; still others might need to
be kept on their toes by a range of vigilant actors. The legitimacy of neither the status
nor the coherence of prevailing forms of internationalism should ever be taken for
granted. Legitimacy, especially of the purported composites of power and idealism that
have marked the most robust internationalism of the past century, can only ever be – and
should only ever be – a provisional achievement, an achievement arrived at through
internationalism’s wrestling with its doubles, be they ideological adversaries,
heterogeneous elements in local conflicts, or the specters of its own unsavory past.
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